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I. Rituals of Decision-making: Political and Legal Procedures in Cultural 
Studies 
Political and legal procedures have received much attention from cultural historians 
over the last ten years1. This is quite surprising, because cultural history was 
originally designed as an alternative to traditional political history. Instead of studying 
the role of great men and events in politics, historians turned first to the subject of 
everyday life, especially the lives of common people, then to the topic of mentalities, 
focusing on  gender, emotions, rituals, symbols, etc. Only recently have historians 
begun to point out that this differentiation between politics and culture is misleading2
Politics are an integral part of culture
. 
 
3. A political system is communicated by rituals 
and symbols. This is the basic proposition of the Münster School of Symbolic 
Communication4, but it had already been stressed by historians like Paul Veyne5 and 
Jean-Michel David6. To understand politics as a complete system it is necessary not 
only to analyze the explicitly political content but also to look at the procedures by 
which political decisions are made. It has become common currency to understand 
the term ‘political communication’ in this twofold sense7
                                      
1 See for example the discussion in DANIEL 2001; DANIEL 1997. 
2 STOLLBERG-RILINGER 2005a. 
3 See CHARTIER 1988. 
4 See for example STOLLBERG-RILINGER 2004; STOLLBERG-RILINGER et ALTHOFF 2007; ALTHOFF 1997; 
ALTHOFF 2003; KRISCHER 2002; KRISCHER 2006. Of course the ritual studies in history were inspired by 
French and Anglo-American Historians like GIESEY 1987; CANNADINE et PRICE 1987; DARNTON 1985; 
BURKE 1987; BURKE 1992; SCHMITT 1990; SCHMITT 2001. 
5 VEYNE 1976. 
6 DAVID 1980. 
7 GOPPOLD 2007. 
. Historians of all periods 
have emphasized that the symbolical representation of politics is itself a political 
 2 
practice, not just  ‘propaganda’, ‘dramatisation of power’, ‘camouflage’ or a distraction 
from ‘real’ political issues8
For instance, if historians study early modern English and French parliaments or a 
council in a German imperial city, they cannot ignore the ritualistic and symbolic 
dimensions of the particular procedures. Jean Fouquet’s depiction of a mid fifteenth-
century parliament, showing the famous lit de justice of Charles VII (1403-1461), 
makes  the significance of these elements clear (Fig. 1). Fouquet’s image shows the 
importance of defining the ‘political field’ (using the term of Pierre Bourdieu
. 
 
9) with 
symbols like tapestries and coats of arms, which set the scene for decision makers 
who are portrayed in attire representing their social status and their political 
importance. Furthermore, the political field had to be demarcated from the space of 
the spectators with furniture10. Pre-modern forums of decision-making like the 
Parisian parlement, the English Parliament or the Imperial Diet were not permanent 
or fixed institutions in the modern sense. On the contrary, they were events, which 
had to be established carefully with the deployment of ritual and symbol11
“The first day of the Parliament, the Prince and all the Lords in their Robes or 
Parliament doe meet in the Higher House, where after Prayers made, they that be 
present are written (…). The place, where the assembly is, is richly tapessed and 
hanged, a Princely and Royall Throne as appertaineth to a King, set in the middlest 
of the higher place thereof. Next under the Prince sitteth the Chancellor (…). On the 
one side of that House or Chamber, sitteth the Archbishops and Bishops, each in his 
. 
 
Writing about the English Parliament in the middle of the sixteenth century, the 
humanist Thomas Smith starts off with a description of inauguration ceremonies and 
the seating of the persons in positions of authority. Different seats were used to 
distinguish between those persons who decide and those who only counsel. The 
counsellors sat on woolsacks, the members of the House of Lords on benches (see 
Fig. 3): 
 
                                      
8 See for example for early modern Germany: STOLLBERG-RILINGER 2005b; for England: SHARPE 2000; 
for ancient history: FLAIG 1992; FLAIG 2003a; FLAIG 1994; FLAIG 1995; FLAIG 2003b. 
9 BOURDIEU 2001. 
10 See also ARLINGHAUS 2005. 
11 DEAN 1995; HOLT 1988. 
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ranke, on the other side the Dukes and Barons. In the middlest thereof vpon 
Wollsackes sitteth the Iudges of the Realme, the Master of the Rolls, and the 
Secretaries. But these that sit on the Wool-Sackes haue no voice in the House, but 
only sit there to answer their knowledge in the Law (…)”12
“Les juges sont reçus aux approches de la ville par le shérif, et souvent par une 
grande partie des plus riches habitants delà province, qui viennent au-devant d'eux, 
ou envoient leurs équipages et leurs plus riches livrées, pour leur servir de cortège et 
en augmenter l'éclat. Ils entrent dans la ville au son des cloches et des trompettes, et 
sont précédés par les gardes du shérif, au nombre de douze à vingt, en grande 
livrée, et armés de longues piques. Ces trompettes et ces gardes restent attachés à 
leur service pendant toute la durée de leur séjour, les accompagnent chaque jour à 
l'audience, et les reconduisent chez eux. Le jour déterminé pour l'ouverture de la 
commission du roi, l'un des juges se rend avec le shérif à l'audience, et y lit la 
commission publiquement. L'audience est ensuite continuée au lendemain. Le 
lendemain, les deux juges se rendent à la cour avec le shérif, dans le cérémonial que 
je viens d'indiquer. L'un d'eux prend séance dans la cour civile, l'autre dans la cour 
criminelle; le shérif en personne reste, pendant tout le temps des assises, à côté du 
juge qui tient la cour criminelle”
. 
 
The framing functions of rituals also applied to legal procedures. When Charles 
Cottu, Counsellor of the Royal Court of Paris, travelled to England in 1820 in order to 
acquaint himself with the British Administration of Justice, he too began his 
descriptions of the assizes (provincial criminal sessions in which the twelve judges of 
the Westminster Courts took part) with the  corresponding rituals: 
 
13
The fact that inaugural rituals in early modern states were usually staged as splendid 
ceremonies does not mean that they were only concerned with pomp and 
circumstance. The essential function of these rituals becomes evident when we study 
pre-modern city states like those in the Holy Roman Empire or ancient Greece. 
Despite the many differences between these two types of city polities, they have 
basic features in common that provide a basis for comparison. My own interpretation 
. 
 
                                      
12 SMITH 1635, p. 77f. 
13 COTTU 1822, p. 43. 
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of political practices in the Imperial Cities has been shaped by Moses Finley’s Politics 
in the Ancient World (1983). His observation that pre-modern city states were 
‘cultures of presence’ is especially helpful for my analysis. As a result of their 
confined space and their populations of not more than 50.000 inhabitants and 
because the media, on which we rely for information in the modern world, did not 
exist, political communication was performed face to face. Those who wanted to be 
political actors had to be present at forums of decision-making14. In pre-modern 
political procedures, presence was a necessary factor of authority, while absence led 
to powerlessness. Even though medieval and ancient city states had established 
forms of political representation that resulted in stable political institutions, the 
congregation of all citizens continued to be a crucial political practice, not least 
because it was a venue for one of the most important political procedures in 
republics, namely elections. If different procedures were carried out by the same 
people in the same social space, these procedures had to be distinguished by the 
performance of particular rituals15. For example, the nearly twenty different law courts 
of medieval Cologne dealt with the same legal matters and were staffed by the same 
legal personnel by and large. The courts were defined primarily by the different 
inauguration rituals and the attire of judges. Gestures and costumes served as 
conveyors of meaning – and they kept this function until the end of the pre-modern 
period around 1800. City counsellors were called to a session by a special bell that 
the citizens and other inhabitants could distinguish from church or fire bells16
                                      
14 This was pointed out for the early modern cities by SCHLÖGL 2004; SCHLÖGL 2007. 
15 ARLINGHAUS 2004. 
16 GOPPOLD 2007, p. 256f. 
. In this 
way special rituals distinguished political meetings from other forms of sociability in 
which the same persons met in the same buildings as members of religious 
fraternities, guilds or patrician clubs. Rituals like the hearing of a political sermon 
defined the situation as political. Rituals of opening corresponded with rituals of 
closing. Because pre-modern political and legal procedures were not part of 
permanent institutions but events, the end of every deliberation or decision-making 
session had to be marked by symbols and rituals. In criminal trials, the judge broke 
his stick, and in the Imperial Diet, the estates met in plenum and were dismissed by 
the emperor in a solemn act (Fig. 3). However, rituals not only served to inaugurate 
and close political procedures. Rituals of interaction, to use a term introduced by 
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Erving Goffman, were also used to structure procedures17. However controversial an 
issue may have been, no procedure could be carried out with certain (and often 
formalistic) civilities and gestures of reconciliation. The procedures still employed by 
the British Parliament are a case in point. Even in the intensely adversarial 
procedures which are characteristic of this body18, the parties have to respect each 
other as legitimate participants of the procedure, and they have to communicate this 
respect by virtue of ritual. In the House of Commons, the tension between acrimony 
and harmony was present even in the sixteenth century. Smith observed that “in such 
a multitude and in such diuersitie of Mindes and Opinions there is the greatest 
modesty and temperance of speech that can be used. Neuerthelesse, with much 
doulce and gentle termes, they make their reasons as violent and as vehement the 
one against the other as they may ordinarily, except it bee for urgent causes, and 
hasting of time”19
The question to be addressed is how such conclusions drawn from the study of 
medieval and early modern procedures can help us understand forms of decision-
making in ancient Greece. Finley stresses the non-organized character of the public 
assemblies in Athens, which were at least not ‘organized’ in the sense of modern 
parliamentarism. There were no formal parties, institutionalized administrations or 
oppositions. “A mass meeting of several thousand men who chose to be present on 
that occasion listened to the speakers – to men who opted to take the floor, without 
holding office, without any formal duty or obligation – and they voted by show of 
hands”
. 
 
20
Even if rituals are a fundamental part of decision-making it is important to distinguish 
carefully between rituals and procedures.  In the strict sense of the word, a procedure 
is an open process of decision-making. At the beginning of a procedure, the parties 
engaged do expect a decision to be reached, but it is not determined what the 
decision will be. However, under certain conditions, procedures are not only framed 
. In many pre-modern societies, ritual compensated for a lack of organization 
and bureaucratization by structuring the political events of decision-making. How did 
the people in ancient Athens solve this problem? 
 
                                      
17 GOFFMAN 1956; GOFFMAN 1967. 
18 KISHLANSKY 1977. 
19 SMITH 1635, p. 86. 
20 FINLEY 1983, p. 76. 
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by rituals, they are rituals, for instance, show trials or the elections and parliaments of 
dictatorships21
II. Procedures and Decision-making 
. If a procedure is a ritual, in which there is a predetermined outcome 
for the procedure, in other words if the final decision has already been made before 
the procedure even begins, then the procedure has only a ritual function. And the 
openness of a procedure is essential for it to function as a generator of binding 
decisions. 
 
A political or legal procedure can be understood as a process of interaction intended 
to lead to binding decisions. The importance of procedures for the stability of political 
orders consists of the guarantee that if the procedure is carried out in a formally 
correct fashion, a decision will be made, and it will be legitimate. This Weberian 
definition does not only apply to the highly elaborate procedure of the pre-modern 
English Parliament22
However, a correctly performed procedure cannot guarantee that the decision is 
good, truthful, just or morally sound. This is the dilemma of a proceduralized 
decision-making, according to the controversial analysis of the German sociologist 
Niklas Luhmann in his book, Legitimation by Procedure
, but also to the comparatively ‘unstructured’ procedure of the 
Assembly in Athens described by Finley. The ‘formal correctness’ of a procedure is a 
historical variable; it was up to contemporaries to evaluate whether a decision-
making process was carried out in the usual and therefore binding way. 
 
23. Even if participants seek a 
just decision by unconstrained argumentation and deliberation as proposed by 
Jürgen Habermas24, we all know that political decisions only become binding with the 
approval of the majority rule25
                                      
21 See for modern democracies EDELMAN 1967. 
22 See REDLICH [1905] 1908. 
23 LUHMANN [1969] 1983. There are no English or French translations of this highly complex sociology, 
for a good English introduction see KING et THORNHILL 2003. 
24 See for further theoretical approaches to decision-making SIKORA 2001. 
25 In most cases, the modern parliamentary debates do not serve as forums of deliberation, but as 
procedures for making binding decisions. The political contents are discussed informally or within the 
committees of the parties. Before they are introduced into the formal parliamentary procedure, they 
are shaped in order to decide, and not to deliberate about it, see LUHMANN [1969] 1983. 
. Tax increases, the declaration of war or the acquittal 
of a mafia boss may be illegitimate according to the beliefs of a people, but they are 
legitimate and legal in terms of the political and legal system. Decisions made in the 
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formally correct and usual way become social facts irrespective of the prevailing 
consent or dissent of the society affected by such decisions. This familiar as well as 
embarrassing phenomenon is in need of explanation26
All political and legal decision-making is about implementing norms. The unique 
function of a procedure is to introduce a temporal dimension to the creation of the 
norm. Procedural decision-making is performed as an interactive process lasting 
hours, days or even months. The duration of a procedure is an essential resource for 
the legitimation of a norm. I have already mentioned the second basic feature of a 
procedure, which is openness or the non-determination of the decision reached. The 
third feature of a procedure is that it provides participants with specific roles: they act 
as judges and defendants, as MPs, speakers, spectators, etc. On the basis of these 
roles and following strict rules, the procedure allows the participants to engage in 
conflict. Just as in cross-examinations, and parliamentary debates, adversarial 
performances were allowed during the Public Assemblies of Athens, but only if the 
participants played by the rules of the game and accepted that the legalized struggle 
was temporally confined and must not transgress the borders of the procedure. 
Procedurally defined conflicts are usually carried out in front of an audience, but the 
participants themselves are also addressees of the performance. The term 
‘performance’ is crucial for the understanding of decision-making by procedure. 
Because besides all rituals mentioned above, every procedure is shaped by implicit, 
unavoidable forms of symbolism. Any human act has performative dimensions
.  
 
27
                                      
26 All following explanations are based on [1969] 1983; See also LUHMANN 1964. 
27 In terms of AUSTIN 1962 (in French 1970); SEARLE 1969. 
. If 
an act is regarded as businesslike, it is the consequence of it having been performed 
in a businesslike manner. Thus, a procedure is a process for making decisions as 
well as for representing, visualizing, and thus performing decision-making. The 
German language offers a good description of this phenomenon, referring to it as the 
‘Herstellung und Darstellung’ of decision-making. The dramatic dimensions of the 
Anglo-American criminal trial, popularized by dozens of movies and serials, are only 
the best example of the performative character of a procedure. In fact, every 
procedure consists of technical and symbolical elements. The dramatic dimensions 
of a procedure, on the one hand, prevail in cases in which the process is conducted 
face to face, in an oral form. Procedures based on writing, on the other, are usually 
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concerned with the ensuing communication of the decisions rather than the 
performative process of making them28. It is important to stress that dramatic and 
symbolical dimensions of a procedure are not particular attributes of pre-modern 
societies or even indicators for a lack of rationality. They are characteristic of every 
procedure, and they fulfil the crucial function of mediating the process for the 
participants and the audience. Because of this, it is vital to analyze the media of 
public and parliamentary debates, particularly the “speech as rhetorical performance, 
as an act intended to persuade and constructed with (different) auditors and 
conventions of persuasion in mind”29
As a process of learning, a procedure can work only if the participants engage in the 
making of the decision, and engagement only makes sense if at the beginning of a 
procedure, the decision is not already determined. Openness motivates participants 
to play their roles, to take the initiative, to debate, to argue for and against, to accuse 
and to defend someone or something. In some cases, active participation and role 
performance are elements of a survival strategy, namely in criminal trials with capital 
punishment at stake. Procedural engagement, however, bears latent consequences: 
it confines the participants to roles specific to the procedure. This was the reason the 
English King Charles I refused to answer the parliamentary court in his trial for 
. 
 
The procedural production of norms before an audience is also a process of learning. 
In a procedure, the decision is not just promulgated like a royal proclamation but is 
rather worked out with the active, even litigant, participation of the persons 
concerned and the passive observation of a larger audience. Procedural learning is 
not simply a cognitive matter. It is not only the losing party that finds out that they did 
not obtain a majority in a particular vote, the audience also learns that a party has 
manoeuvred itself into a minority position. The social function of a procedure cannot 
be described as gaining consensus for politically controversial issues, convincing 
dissenters with better arguments or making defendants accept and appreciate their 
judgment. Through the procedure, the losing party is socially isolated and excluded 
from solidarity while the position of the winning party is represented as socially 
legitimate. 
 
                                      
28 KIESERLING 1995. 
29 SHARPE 2000, p. 15; See also the works of the ‚Cambridge School’, e.g. SKINNER 1996. 
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treason in 1649: He refused to take the role of a defendant. In any other case, 
agency within the procedure is a tacit endorsement of the effective norms of the 
decision-making process. Even if participants try to obviate the procedures, their 
agitation against the rules is an acknowledgement of them. This unintended 
obligation is crucial for the validity of the decision. Using the metaphor of play, one 
could say that those who accept the rules of the game have to accept that there will 
be winners and losers. Luhmann therefore refers to procedural engagement as a 
form of ‘enmeshment’ or ‘implication’. Those who will lose the case in the end play an 
especially essential role. Their agency turns into an expressive performance 
confirming the norms of the decision-making process. Luhmann calls this “unpaid 
ceremonial work”30, which is a functional as well as symbolical and expressive 
commitment motivated only by the belief in the undecided outcome of the procedure. 
This social logic of decision-making as an interactive process primarily relates to the 
losing parties in political and legal trials. However, those who win the case or the vote 
are also enmeshed into the procedure. In the Middle Ages, participants who acted as 
counsellors in the process of decision-making were required to contribute to the 
execution of the decision31. Medieval feudal doctrine explained this form of 
enmeshment as the connection and reciprocity of ‘consilium et auxilium’, counsel and 
help32
Up to this point, I have stressed the adversarial and enmeshing dimensions of a 
procedure. But under certain conditions a procedure can also fulfil integrative and 
unifying functions. This is another important symbolical dimension. The participants 
of a process of decision-making regard themselves as members of a whole, as part 
of a polity. In other cases, procedures have to offer incentives to keep the 
participants involved in the process of decision-making. This is usually the case if 
quasi autonomous actors form the political body. Examples can be found in modern 
supranational organizations like the UNO or the EU, but also in historical institutions 
like the Imperial Diet of the Holy Roman Empire. The respective procedures in such 
contexts did not work in a parliamentarian form, that is, as debates and elections. In 
order not to offend the participants, the rules of the procedures prevented parties 
: Who gives counsel is bound to help implementing his advice. 
 
                                      
30 LUHMANN [1969] 1983, p. 114: „unbezahlte zeremonielle Arbeit“. 
31 LUHMANN [1969] 1983, p. 87. 
32 BRUNNER [1939] 1965, p. 217. 
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from becoming politically isolated in the minority, a position which corresponds, as 
we have seen, to social isolation. In the Imperial Diet, losing a poll would have been 
equivalent to a loss of face. In any such case, the participants announced their exit 
from the procedures and declared that they would not approve the decision. Although 
the Imperial Diet allowed majority rule in the councils of the estates, this method of 
decision-making was usually avoided. It was necessary to establish a procedure in 
which the technical and symbolical dimensions of decision-making were compatible 
with the self-perception of the participants as autonomous and even sovereign 
actors. Even if a decision had finally been made in account of particular actors, it was 
essential that the performance did not marginalize the other participants. The losing 
parties still had to be dignified by symbolical communication. In the Imperial Diet, this 
balancing act between decision-making and integration was achieved by the voting-
in-circle-procedure, which combined debating and voting. In their speeches the 
participants had to indicate their preferences without offending others. In many cases 
a poll was taken two or three times until a prevailing opinion had emerged. In giving 
the participants the chance to reach an agreement with each other, voting-in-circle 
aimed for consensus. However, this procedure was often in danger of becoming a 
ritual, that is, the performance of an already determined process. In many cases, the 
most powerful actors enforced their interests and used the procedure only for 
acclamation. Egon Flaig has shown that this was also the case in the comitia of the 
Roman Republic. These meetings lost their real function as forums of decision-
making and became rituals symbolizing consensus between the people of Rome and 
the ruling aristocracy33
III. From ritual to rationality? Legitimation by procedure and the process 
of modernization 
. This was obviously different in Athens. As Finley has shown, 
the Public Assembly was marked by debates and open struggles for majority. 
 
Theoretical approaches to decision-making can only explain the formal structure and 
the social logic of a procedure. They can not disclose the secret of how to make a 
just and sound decision. Although Luhmann’s theory of that procedural legitimation is 
achieved by socially isolating the losing party may sound cynical it is also a warning 
against blindly trusting the rationality of political and legal procedures. Luhmann’s 
                                      
33 FLAIG 2003a, p. 167. 
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theory describes the proceduralized reality unvarnished. It can offer no alternative to 
the reality it describes; it is not ‘idealistic’ like Habermas’ Theory of Communicative 
Action (Théorie de l'agir communicationnel). However, it is this realistic approach that 
makes Luhmann’s theory so intriguing for historians. 
 
Like Luhmann, other sociologists are sceptical about the connection of procedures 
and rationality. Obviously, rationality is represented or even symbolized rather than 
created by procedures. American scholars like James G. March, Karl Weick, John W. 
Meyer, Walter Powell or Herbert A. Simon have stressed again and again that 
processes of decision-making in modern politics and in the economy always have a 
‘bounded rationality’34. The lack of rationality, however, can never be filled, only 
‘absorbed’35. Thus, decision-making in modern organizations is always based on 
‘myths of rationality’36. Formal structures and procedures in particular tend to be 
‘myths’ and ‘ceremonies’37. The same is true for politics, as James G. March and 
Johan P. Olsen have emphasized: “Modern politics are as replete with symbols, 
ritual, ceremony, and myth as the societies more familiar to anthropological 
tradition“38
However, one dimension of the procedure has changed profoundly over the course 
of history and is therefore essential for historians to study: procedural autonomy. 
Sociologists refer to the term autonomy to describe the relationship between a 
procedure and its social environment. The questions relating to this phenomenon 
. 
 
I mention this because it is quite typical for historians of the pre-modern world to 
assume that modern society is based on rational bureaucratization. Hence they 
interpret rituals or the performative dimensions of procedures in the ancient, 
medieval or early modern cultures as something irrational, as deficits that have been 
eliminated since the Age of Enlightenment. Obviously, it is important to refer to 
sociologists to resolve this misunderstanding. Modernization did not abolish the 
symbolical dimensions of decision-making; it reshaped these dimensions.  
 
                                      
34 MARCH et SIMON 1958, p. 142-150. 
35 “Uncertainty absorption“ in terms of MARCH et SIMON 1958, p. 165. 
36 FELDMAN et MARCH 1981. 
37 MEYER et ROWAN 1977. 
38 MARCH et OLSEN 1984, p. 738. The same conclusion is drawn in CREWE et MÜLLER 2006. 
 12 
are: did a procedure produce decisions according to its own logic and mechanisms, 
or did it ‘borrow’ elements from other social practices? For example, the medieval 
criminal trial used ordeals as part of the decision-making process, thereby directly 
implementing a transcendent authority in the procedure. In legal procedures, 
autonomy is usually increased with the creation of elaborated rules that dictate the 
process, like a law of evidence, for instance. Did a procedure implement its own roles 
or did the participants act directly as, for example, a general, a nobleman, an outsider 
or an oligarch instead of a plaintiff, defendant or parliamentarian? Was the rule ‘one 
man, one vote’, or were the votes ‘weighed’? Is one procedure clearly distinguishable 
from another? This was often not the case in pre-modern city states. Political and 
legal procedures merged. However, procedural autonomy is not a moral qualification 
of a decision-making, but a historical variable. In the pre-modern world, autonomy 
increased and then decreased. What was achieved in Late Antiquity was lost in the 
early Middle Ages. In many cases, the degree of procedural autonomy in a society 
corresponded to the structure of that society; less differentiated societies like the 
medieval and ancient city-states were based on less autonomous procedures. This 
equivalence was highly functional and essential for the polity. Less autonomous 
procedures offered wider participation, paid respect to dignity of the participants, 
procured integration instead of separation and were therefore vital for political 
stability. 
 
Conclusion 
In this article I have presented some theories that historians of the early modern 
period use to analyze decision-making by procedure. In particular, I argue that Niklas 
Luhmann’s theory of legitimation by procedure is adaptable for historians of all 
periods. Luhmann explains the way decision-making functions not by looking at the 
contents of procedures, but at the forms; not at what is decided, but how this decision 
was actually made. This draws attention to the procedure as a process with technical 
and symbolical dimensions. Rituals are an integral part of procedures, although 
historians must always be aware that procedures can merge with rituals and, 
thereby, lose their function as forums of decision making. Usually, procedural 
decision-making is carried out as an interactive process that motivates the 
participants to engage in it. This motivation derives from the indeterminate outcome 
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of the procedure. However, procedural engagement can turn into enmeshment. 
According to the rules of the procedure, the participants are forced to acknowledge 
what they have worked out themselves. Furthermore, most procedures are 
addressed to a public which is used to recognizing decisions as legitimate and legal if 
they are made in a formally correct and conventional manner. However, a familiar 
and embarrassing feature of procedures is that they can produce binding decisions 
irrespective of society’s consent or dissent. This procedural power is at least the 
reality in the modern world. Historians researching the importance of counselling, 
deliberation and decision-making in traditional societies have to analyze to what 
extent respective procedures had the ability to make binding decisions. A sociological 
theory designed for the interpretation of the modern world cannot simply be 
transferred to traditional societies. However, theory helps increase the awareness of 
the concepts historians make use of. Different forms of decision-making like rituals 
and procedures can be distinguished and denominated. Using Luhmann’s model of 
the procedure, given examples can be analyzed and described. The category 
‘procedure’ is a historical variable that took different forms over the course of history. 
Admittedly, although procedures can guarantee the making of decision, they cannot 
guarantee a just and sound decision. This dilemma is a historical constant of 
procedures in antiquity as well as in the modern world. 
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Fig. 1: Jean Fouquet: Le Lit de justice de Vendôme, Boccace, Des cas des nobles hommes et 
femmes, enluminure de Jean Fouquet, Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliotek, Cod. Gall. 6, fol. 2v. 
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Fig. 3: Elizabeth I in parliament, from Robert Glover: Nobilitas politica vel ciuilis Personas 
scilicet distinguendi, et ab origine inter gentes, ex principum gratia nobilitandi forma, London 
1608, British Musuem 1849,1208.689. 
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Fig. 3: Opening the Imperial Diet (17th Century), from: Krischer 2006. 
 
